How Iran's shadowy role in Syria fuels paranoia and wariness
Iran’s embassy in the Mezze district of Damascus is a
striking-looking building – the facade covered in elaborately decorated
turquoise tiles that would look at home in Isfahan or Tabriz. Its roof
bristles with communications antennae and it is guarded by
machine-gun-toting security men and a high, earth-filled blast barrier
that juts awkwardly into the busy main road outside.
The embassy is the most visible sign of the Islamic Republic’s presence in Syria.
Its economic, political and military backing for President Bashar
al-Assad has been crucial for the last four-and-a-half years. And it
looks like becoming more so – both in shaping events on the ground and,
perhaps, in international efforts to end the conflict. “The Syrian
regime is increasingly dependent on Iran,” says a senior western
diplomat. “Its footprint is growing.”
Iran’s fundamental view of the crisis, ambassador Mohammed Reza
Shaybani explains in his elegant third-floor office, is that foreigners
must not intervene. “We have to respect Syria’s national sovereignty and
territorial integrity,” he told the Guardian. “Iran does not interfere
in Syrian domestic affairs. Our relations are historical and strategic.
Our role is limited to consultation with the Syrian government for the
sake of combating terrorism.”
Shaybani, urbane and articulate in both Arabic and English, is keen to emphasise Tehran’s constructive posture in the wake of July’s landmark nuclear agreement – its ticket to international respectability after of years of sanctions and isolation.
“We provide advice to the Syrian government and the Syrian army,” he
says. “It is natural that that requires us to see reality on the ground.
The military advisers need to have a clear understanding of the
situation on the battlefield. That does not mean that we have a lot of
troops in Syria; we do not have a direct role in the fighting.”
Hard facts are elusive, but most analysts agree that Iran’s direct
military presence is indeed fairly modest. It is led by the elite Quds
force of the Islamic revolutionary guards corps (IRGC) and thought to
number in the hundreds. Still, dozens of its men, including at least seven senior officers, have been killed in Syria since 2012.
Iran also works with Hezbollah, its close Lebanese Shia ally, and with
units of Shia fighters from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. General
Qassem Suleimani, the famous Quds force commander, visited the Idlib
area in June amid talks of a counter-offensive against advancing
anti-Assad rebels.
Outside the Damascus embassy the Iranians keep a lower profile than
the Russians, who have a naval base near Latakia and a more visible role
boosted by the arrival of new equipment and personnel.
IRGC advisers, who are occasionally spotted near the frontlines, shun
publicity. Fit-looking Iranians in civilian clothes are sometimes seen
crossing the Lebanese border, handing over their passports en masse
without being required to leave their vehicles – a sure sign of their
discreet VIP status.
“The Iranians are there – and they are not there,” quips a Sunni
businessman from Homs. “They are a ghostly presence.” Speculation about
their activities is rife. But the consensus among many Syrians and
foreign experts is that their role is extremely important – though very
shadowy.
“We know quite a lot about what the Iranians do in specific places –
we see weapons, equipment and intercepts – but we still don’t have an
understanding of what they do in institutional terms,” says Emile
Hokayem of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).
“The question is to what extent they are involved in planning and
command and control.”
Iran’s ambassador to Syria, Mohammed Reza Shaybani. Photograph: Ian Black for the GuardianIran has certainly provided a financial lifeline to Assad since the
2011 uprising, releasing billions of dollars of loans and credit for
imports of oil and other commodities. Another important contribution was
setting up the national defence forces (NDF), locally-based militia
units outside the regular army, which have acquired a reputation for
profiteering and brutality. But in recent months Iran
is said to have stopped paying NDF personnel, adding to the growing
strain on the Assad regime – admitted by the president in an unusually
frank speech in July.The Damascus rumour mill suggests some senior Syrian officials are
unhappy with the Iranian role – but that their dependence on Tehran
means they have to grin and bear it.Relations go back to Syrian backing for the 1979 Islamic revolution –
and Hafez al-Assad’s support for Iran during the grinding eight-year
war with Iraq. Still, at the personal level, Russians are more
comfortable allies for a relentlessly secular regime – their vodka
toasts easier to stomach than the dour religiosity of the Iranians,
laughs a well-connected foreign observer.And on one view, Moscow’s increasingly active role reflects in part
its own unease at Tehran’s growing influence in Syria and an effort to
obtain greater leverage over Assad.It is a measure of Tehran’s clout that Iranian officials, with
Hezbollah representatives, have in recent weeks been directly conducting
ceasefire negotiations over the strategic town of Zabadani, near the
Lebanese border – as they did last year over the siege of Homs in
central Syria. The rebel fighters in Zabadani are from Ahrar al-Sham, a
big Sunni Islamist group that is backed by the Turks and is trying to
appeal to western countries.
Further north, in Idlib province, its men are besieging the two Shia
villages of Foua and Kafraya. The Iranians demanded a Sunni-Shia
population exchange and want to resettle the Shia around the Sayyida
Zeinab shrine – revered by Shia everywhere – in Damascus. To suspicious
Syrians that sounds like a plan for replicating Hezbollah’s stronghold
in the southern suburbs of Beirut – and making sectarian cleansing an
explicit element in the war.Faisal Itani, of the Atlantic Council,
said: “Iran’s handling of the Zabadani crisis indicates a shift in its
Syria strategy, in which it either negotiates on behalf of or ignores
Assad and his inner circle, securing its interests directly rather than
by proxy.”
Unconfirmed reports
– emanating from unidentified Israeli security officials – say that the
Iranians have committed “hundreds” of IRGC personnel to the battle for
Zabadani.
Ordinary Syrians fret about wider Iranian influence: Damascenes
gossip about land confiscated in Mezze to build a big Iranian housing
project as well as a new embassy closer to the city centre; about
Iranians buying up prime real estate, often anonymously. Last year 35%
of all Syrian imports came from Iran. Now many government tenders are
open only to Iranians.
“Syria has been sold to the Iranians,” complains a resident of one of
the capital’s better neighbourhoods. “They control everything.”
Prejudice and paranoia make for a toxic argument that is promoted
energetically by the Syrian opposition. Some even describe Syria as
“Iranian-occupied” – a wild exaggeration.
Still, even some Assad loyalists are clearly worried. “Iranians
could really control everything because they hold all the keys,” says a
respected lawyer, insisting on anonymity. “But they would be in direct
conflict with the Saudis and the Americans and the international
community if they were more overt. So they apply pressure quietly and
acquire more cards to play. But yes, they have their own people here.”
Members of Syria’s small Shia Muslim community – as distinct from
the Assad family’s Alawite sect – warn that it is important to
distinguish between Iran’s national and strategic interests and its role
as the spiritual centre of the Shia faith. But the distinction feels
lost in al-Ameen, the Shia quarter of the old city of Damascus – whose
alleyways are plastered with posters commemorating the dead of fighting
units with resonant religious names like Fatemiyoun, Zaynabiyoun or the
Sayyida Ruqayya Martyrs Brigade.
Alarm about a Shia Ashoura procession at the (Sunni) Umayyad Mosque
is overblown, insists Shia journalist Maher Ashqar, but he admits
ruefully that sectarian tensions are rising. “Iran’s role in Syria is
important and growing, but it is exaggerated. Syrians are suspicious of
it – but they are also suspicious of al-Qaida. Iran does have a national
agenda but many here believe it is helping the Shia.”
The Iranians radiate growing confidence internationally but they will
not persuade anti-Assad Syrians of their good intentions or the
sincerity of their professed belief in non-intervention. “The more the
Iranians speak about Syria’s sovereignty the more they violate it,”
argues Ibrahim Hamidi, a highly-regarded Syrian journalist with the
London-based al-Hayat newspaper. “The more they talk about national
identity the more they promote sub-identities. The more they talk about
fighting Isis, the more they provoke it. Whatever the Iranians say, they
do the opposite. The Iranians are trying to play the same role in Syria
as Syria used to play in Lebanon: they create their own clients and
they hold the balance between different centres of power. Now the
Iranians are trying to create their own parallel regime – with their
militias, businessmen and properties, and social engineering.”
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