How many times have we been around this block before – and not just in Syria? A ceasefire is proposed by outside powers; it is sort-of accepted by the most representative group of combatants you are going to get, only for it not to materialise either on the appointed day, or at all. For all the weary pessimism that has greeted it, however, the ceasefire – or, to be precise, halt to “combat operations” – discussed by Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin on Sunday,made public on Monday and accepted by most parties yesterday, deserves a more positive international response than it has so far received. One reason why disbelief should be at least suspended is that this is not actually the umpteenth time we have been around this particular block in Syria. It is rather the de facto extension of the ceasefire arrangement agreed under UN auspices by John Kerry, the US secretary of state, and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, 10 days ago. It was accepted then that the timetable – for firing to stop within the week – was ambitious, and so it proved.
Now, with the extra imprimatur provided by presidents Obama and Putin, it appears to be back on. It took the Syrian government and the main opposition umbrella group only hours to accept. If a ceasefire, however imperfect, starts to come into effect late this week, that will not be too bad as these things go. It is, after all, the first serious attempt at halting the fighting between the troops still loyal to Bashar al-Assad’s government and the disparate forces arrayed against him. It deserves, in the old cliche, to be given a chance.
The scope of the agreement is more limited than anything mooted at the Vienna talks last year, which are still in abeyance. The main purpose – so far the only purpose – is to halt the fighting in particular areas for long enough to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid and perhaps also the rescue of the wounded and sick civilians.
For as long as it holds (if it does), the ceasefire will show whether there is enough of a command structure to make further agreements feasible – possibly agreements with a more political dimension. Even if compliance were only patchy, that would still be an improvement on the war zones that pockmark Syriatoday. It might also indicate any potential for one or more no-fly zones or secure areas where displaced civilians could be safe.
There has been a widespread assumption that Russia’s military intervention last autumn scuppered any plan for a no-fly zone, as Russian planes were most active over the very airspace where a secure zone had been envisaged. Russian officials, however, have never ruled out the concept, and a location guaranteed jointly byRussia and the United States would carry more conviction in current circumstances than one ordained by the US and its immediate allies alone.
It is frequently argued that the number of combatants and their patrons now embroiled in the Syria conflict, as well as the many disparate and directly conflicting interests they represent, militates against any settlement, perhaps for many years. What began as a challenge to Assad’s rule and grew into a civil war, so the thinking goes, is nowhere near exhausted. None of the parties are anything like running out of money, manpower or political will.
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