Point, counterpoint: does 'reformists versus hardliners' still cut it in Iranian politics?

‘The reformists’ electoral strategy has beaten fundamentalist conservatives at their own game’

Mahmoud Sadri

Some called it an oxymoron; others saw it as the proverbial camel, a horse designed by a committee. But Iran’s constitution, hammered out in the wake of the 1979 Islamic Revolution, remains the only one of its kind to combine the conflicting principles of democracy and theocracy.

It has ushered in a dual system of government that has survived for nearly four decades. However, the hybrid has come with a hefty price tag: a relentless contest between the opposing principles and their advocates has bedevilled the Islamic Republic and hampered its ability to manage internal and external crises. A string of debacles including the American hostage crisis, the protracted war with Iraq and the bloody suppression of the “the Green Movement protests” are traceable to the tension between democracy and theocracy enshrined in the constitution.

This is the context within which the election on 26 February should be understood. Iranians will elect the representatives for the tenth term of the Iranian parliament (Majlis) and the fifth term of the Assembly of Experts, which is charged with choosing the next supreme leader.

The contest resembles the latest round of an ongoing chess tournament between old rivals. The theocratic (fundamentalist or ‘principle-ist’) camp, aware of its lack of popularity, resorts to the levers of power it controls: the security forces, public broadcasting, supervisory bodies, and the judiciary. The democratic (reformer and moderate) side controls the presidency and the parliament through regularly winning elections despite the increasingly intrusive and partisan vetting process for candidates – as well as the veto powers of the authoritarian bodies overseeing the president and the parliament.