The Syrian war has lasted so long and diplomacy has proved so ineffective that the hope that it could end or at least be brought under some kind of control is hard to sustain. Yet the cessation of hostilities agreed by nearly all of the warring parties seemed to be holding this weekend. Most observers give it a chance, not because of some sudden change of heart on anybody’s part – nearly all those concerned still hate each other – but because it is arguably in the interests of the key players to pursue their objectives in the future in a different way.
That way will not exclude violence, but could greatly reduce its role in the conflict. It is also true that Syria is such a complicated and dangerous mess that even states which are opposed to each other sense the need to cooperate in order to avert dangers that they cannot deal with on their own. Syria is like a clover leaf motorway interchange in very bad weather, threatening a multi-vehicle pile-up at any moment.
It has to be immediately added that the cessation deal is very much on Russia’s terms, that it favours the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, that violations have already occurred and will continue, and that the danger of a Russo-Turkish clash is still a real one. Indeed, the threat of a wider war has been the main driver in the negotiations which led up to the cessation deal.
King Abdullah of Jordan has said that the Russian military intervention “had shaken the tree”, and it is certainly true that President Vladimir Putin’s decision to send substantial forces to Syria has transformed the situation in that country. His move was initially derided by some because Russian planes and tanks did not at first seem to be making much difference to the military balance between the regime and the rebels, but as the weight of Russian arms began to tell, perceptions shifted. The Russians rescued the regime and strengthened it to the point where the idea that it might be toppled became, at most, a very distant prospect.
Rebel groups were at a stroke deprived of their principal war aim. Yet Moscow’s success brought its own problems. Making war is easier than devising political solutions. It seems unlikely that Russia wants to underpin the Assad regime militarily, and certainly not to fight for it, for ever.
The ultimate aim is presumably to secure a stable Syrian entity as an ally and a client, yet that is almost certainly incompatible with unqualified support for President Assad, or with helping him regain full control of Syria, his proclaimed objective. Moscow has been talking to a range of opposition figures, and may well understand, by now, that few would consent to cosmetic incorporation in an unchanged regime, and that there will eventually have to be an internal settlement that the Sunni Arab majority and the Kurds can tolerate, and not just those Sunni loyalists who had stuck with President Assad all along. A joint offensive against Islamic State, involving both regime and rebel forces, as well as coordination with the western coalition against Isis, is an equally tricky prospect. Putting Syria back together after that as even a loosely federated state will be a daunting task.
The US secretary of state, John Kerry, has played a weak hand well. America forfeited influence in Damascus years ago, when it came out prematurely against President Assad. It lost more when President Barack Obama decided not to bomb Syrian targets in 2013 in retaliation for the regime’s use of chemical weapons. The campaign it has led against Isis in Iraq and Syria has been a very slow-burning affair, and its grip on Iraq’s faltering progress less than impressive. What Mr Kerry has done is to take Russia’s project and to try to bend it so that it serves the interests of America, Europe, and other concerned states as well. Russia and the US need each other, and at the same time are trying to use each other. This could so easily go wrong but it is the only game in town, and the only one which promises some relief for Syria’s suffering people.
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