The Obama administration has clearly pulled back from the United States’ recent interventionism
in the Middle East, notwithstanding the rise of the Islamic State (also
known as ISIS) and the U.S.-led air war against it. Critics pin the
change on the administration’s aversion to U.S. activism in the region,
its unwillingness to engage in major combat operations, or President
Barack Obama’s alleged ideological preference for diminished global engagement.
But the reality is that Washington’s post-9/11 interventions in the
region—especially the one in Iraq—were anomalous and shaped false
perceptions of a “new normal” of American intervention, both at home and
in the region. The administration’s unwillingness to use ground forces
in Iraq or Syria constitutes not so much a withdrawal as a correction—an
attempt to restore the stability that had endured for several decades
thanks to American restraint, not American aggressiveness.
It’s possible to argue that pulling back is less a choice than a necessity. Some realist observers claim that in a time of economic uncertainty and cuts to the U.S. military budget, an expansive U.S. policy in the region has simply become too costly. According to that view, the United States, like the United Kingdom before it, is the victim of its own “imperial overstretch.” Others argue that U.S.
It’s possible to argue that pulling back is less a choice than a necessity. Some realist observers claim that in a time of economic uncertainty and cuts to the U.S. military budget, an expansive U.S. policy in the region has simply become too costly. According to that view, the United States, like the United Kingdom before it, is the victim of its own “imperial overstretch.” Others argue that U.S.
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